The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly
John D. Inazu*
The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the most important social
movements in American history: antebellum abolitionism, women’s suffrage in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New Deal, and
the Civil Rights movement. Claims of assembly stood against the ideological tyranny that
exploded during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the First World War and the second
Red Scare of 1950s’ McCarthyism. Abraham Lincoln once called “the right of peaceable
assembly” part of “the Constitutional substitute for revolution.” In 1939, the popular press
heralded it as one of the “four freedoms” at the core of the Bill of Rights. And even as late as
1973, John Rawls characterized it as one of the “basic liberties.” But in the past thirty years,
assembly has been reduced to a historical footnote in American law and political theory. Why
has assembly so utterly disappeared from our democratic fabric? This Article explores the
history of the freedom of assembly and what we may have lost in losing sight of that history.
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INTRODUCTION

The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the
most important social movements in American history: antebellum
abolitionism, women’s suffrage in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New
Deal, and the Civil Rights movement. Claims of assembly stood
against the ideological tyranny that exploded during the first Red Scare
in the years surrounding the First World War and the second Red Scare
of 1950s’ McCarthyism. Abraham Lincoln once called “the right of
peaceable assembly” part of “the Constitutional substitute for revolution.”1 In 1939, the popular press heralded it as one of the “four
freedoms” at the core of the Bill of Rights. And even as late as 1973,
John Rawls characterized it as one of the “basic liberties.”2 But in the
past thirty years, the freedom of assembly has been reduced to a
historical footnote in American political theory and law. Why has
assembly so utterly disappeared from our democratic fabric?
One might, with good reason, contend that the right of assembly
has been subsumed into the rights of speech and association and that
these two rights provide adequate protection for the people gathered.
On this account, contemporary free speech doctrine protects the “most
pristine and classic form” of assembly—the occasional gathering of
temporary duration that often takes the form of a protest, parade, or
demonstration.3 Meanwhile, the judicially recognized right of
association shelters forms of assembly that extend across time and
place—groups like clubs, churches, and social organizations.
This characterization of the rights of speech and association is not
implausible. Indeed, it appears to be the approach assumed by a
1.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Alexander H. Stephens (Jan. 19, 1860), in
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 127 (Gilbert A. Tracy ed., 1917). In the same
letter, Lincoln also wrote: “[T]he right of peaceable assembly and of petition and by article
Fifth of the Constitution, the right of amendment, is the Constitutional substitute for
revolution. Here is our Magna Carta not wrested by Barons from King John, but the free gift
of states to the nation they create . . . .” Id.
2.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971). Rawls relies primarily on
association rather than assembly in his later work. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 221 n.8, 291, 338, 418 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. But
cf. id. at 335 (mentioning assembly).
3.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“most pristine and classic
form”).
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number of contemporary political theorists.4 Nevertheless, I want to
suggest that something is lost when assembly is dichotomously
construed as either a moment of expression (when it is viewed as
speech) or an expressionless group (when it is viewed as association).
Many group expressions are only made intelligible by the practices
that give them meaning. The rituals and liturgy of religious worship
often embody deeper meaning than that which would be ascribed to
them by an outside observer. The political significance of a women’s
pageant in the 1920s would be lost without an understanding of why
these women gathered or what they were doing with the rest of their
lives. And the creeds and songs recited by members of hundreds of
diverse associations, from Alcoholics Anonymous to the Boy Scouts,
during their gatherings may reflect a way of living and system of
beliefs that cannot be captured by a text or its utterance at any one
event.5
The United States Supreme Court has partially recognized these
connections in the category of “expressive association” that it
introduced in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.6 But by privileging
“intimate” over expressive association and declaring the latter merely
instrumentally valuable to other modes of communication, the Court
has obfuscated the critical role that a group’s practices and identity
play in its expression. Even worse, the attenuated protections of
expressive association underwrite a political theory whose espoused
tolerance ends with those groups that challenge the fundamental
assumptions of the liberal state. These changes open the door for the
state to demand what Nancy Rosenblum has called a “logic of congruence” requiring “that the internal life and organization of associations
mirror liberal democratic principles and practices.”7
William Galston intimates that this result undermines liberalism
itself: “Liberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in
favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit,
within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their
4.
See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2.
5.
This argument is not meant to be universal. Some assemblies that gather in single
instances of fixed duration may present a relatively coherent message absent any collective
background identity. A group of strangers that gathers in front of a prison to protest an
execution is one example.
6.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 622 (1984).
7.
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA 37 (1998).
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own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.”8 We do not
live under Galston’s “rebuttable presumption.” If we did, we might
hear more about polygamist Mormons, communist schoolteachers, allmale Jaycees, and peyote-consuming Native Americans. And while
today’s cultural and legal climate raises the most serious challenges to
practices at odds with liberal democratic values, the eclectic collection
of groups that have at one time or another been silenced and stilled by
the state cuts across political and ideological boundaries. The freedom
of assembly has opposed these incursions throughout our nation’s
history. As C. Edwin Baker has argued, “[T]he function of constitutional rights, and more specifically the role of the right of assembly, is
to protect self-expressive, nonviolent, noncoercive conduct from
majority norms or political balancing and even to permit people to be
offensive, annoying, or challenging to dominant norms.”9 This core
role of assembly and its broad appeal to groups of markedly different
ideologies makes it a better “fit” than the right of association within
our nation’s legal and political heritage.10
Recognizing this fit requires learning the story of the right of
assembly. This is no easy task. The right of association is now firmly
entrenched in our legal and political vernacular. Consider the
following: (1) at least twenty-five federal district and appellate court
opinions have referred to a nonexistent “freedom of association
clause” in the United States Constitution;11 (2) a federal appellate court
has denied associational protections to an all-male Jewish fraternity
after intimating that the fraternity was neither an intimate nor an
8.
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2002).
9.
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 134 (1989).
10. By “fit,” I mean to suggest the coherence with an ongoing tradition and social
practice intimated in different ways by both Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY
IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed., Univ. Notre Dame Press 2007) (1981).
11. See, e.g., Swanson v. City of Bruce, No. 03-60541, 2004 WL 1491594, at *3 (5th
Cir. July 1, 2004) (referring to “the freedom of association clause”); Boyle v. County of
Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that the plurality opinion in Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), “held that the discharge of a government employee because of
his political affiliation violates the freedom of association clause of the First Amendment”);
Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, No. 90-5453, 1991 WL 11255 (6th Cir. Feb. 1,
1991) (discussing the requirements for a prima facie case under “the freedom of association
clause of the first amendment”); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F.
Supp. 2d 1186, 1203 (D. Wyo. 2006) (“The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and
Freedom of Association Clauses apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 543 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (“The Supreme Court
has interpreted the First Amendment to provide little protection under the Freedom of
Association Clause to commercial enterprises.”).
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expressive association;12 and (3) a well-respected commentator has
argued that in sixteen years, Roberts came to represent “a well-settled
law of freedom of association,” an “ancien regime.”13 In this context, it
takes effort to envision an alternative understanding of the
constitutional protections for groups. Accordingly, part of my task is
to cast a vision for recovering the freedom of assembly. Doing so
requires creative engagement with regnant legal doctrine and political
theory, particularly that espoused by the Supreme Court and its
commentators over the past half-century. But this is a task worth
doing. Constitutional language—and the ways in which we use it or
ignore it—matters to the views we form about the law. Words like
“assembly” and “association” by themselves convey little of the values
that underlie the inevitable line-drawing that takes place around our
civil liberties,14 but in our constitutional story, these words come to
represent the values that helped to shape them and give them
constitutional salience.15 Forgetting words may represent the final
stage of forgetting values; reclaiming words can be a first step to
reclaiming those values.

12. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136
(2d Cir. 2007). The fraternity was located at the College of Staten Island, which is “primarily
a commuter campus,” and it never had more than twenty members. Id. at 140, 145.
13. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE CASE OF BOY
SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION, at xi (2009)
(arguing that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), “disrupted” the law of
freedom of association). Koppelman acknowledges the “germinal case” of the right of
association in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), see KOPPELMAN, supra, at 18-22, but
it is clear that Roberts rather than NAACP v. Alabama does most of the work that he wants to
embrace as the “well-settled law of freedom of association.”
14. I do not presume that unbounded group autonomy is either preferable or possible.
To borrow from Stanley Fish, there is “no such thing as free assembly.” The state always
constrains. The pertinent inquiry is therefore not whether the state can constrain group
autonomy, but the conditions under which those constraints will be imposed. See STANLEY
FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 104 (1994)
(“Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts
of some assumed conception of the good to which it must yield in the event of conflict.”); cf.
Peter de Marneffe, Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association, in FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, AT 146 (“Some may think of rights as ‘absolute,’ believing that to
say that there is a right to some liberty is to say that the government may not interfere with
this liberty for any reason. But if this is how rights are understood, there are virtually no
rights to liberty—because for virtually every liberty there will be some morally sufficient
reason for the government to interfere with it.”).
15. Frederick Schauer uses the phrase “constitutional salience” to refer to “the often
mysterious political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces
that influence which policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not.”
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).

570

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:565

In the pages that follow, I take this first step by tracing the story
of the freedom of assembly. This is the right of assembly “violently
wrested” from enslaved and free African Americans in the South and
denied to abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison in the North. It is the
freedom recognized in public celebrations across the nation as
America entered the Second World War—at the very time it was
denied to 120,000 Japanese Americans. It is the right placed at the
core of democracy by eminent twentieth-century Americans, including
Dorothy Thompson, Zechariah Chafee, Louis Brandeis, Orson Welles,
and Eleanor Roosevelt.
I begin by examining the constitutional grounding of assembly in
the Bill of Rights. I then explore the use of assembly in legal and
political discourse in six periods of American history: (1) the closing
years of the eighteenth century that brought the first test of assembly
through the Democratic-Republican Societies; (2) the appeals to
assembly in the suffragist and abolitionist movements of the
antebellum era; (3) the narrowing of the constitutional right of
assembly by the Supreme Court following the Civil War; (4) the claims
of assembly by suffragists, civil rights activists, and organized labor
during the Progressive Era; (5) the rhetorical high point of assembly
between the two World Wars; and (6) the end of assembly amidst midtwentieth century liberalism and the rise of the freedom of association.
As I recount the role of assembly in the political history of the
United States, I pay particular attention to three of its characteristics.
First, groups invoking the right of assembly have inherently been those
that dissent from the majority and consensus standards endorsed by
government. Second, claims of assembly have been public claims that
advocate for a visible political space distinguishable from government.
Finally, manifestations of assembly have themselves been forms of
expression—parades, strikes, and demonstrations, but also more
creative forms of engagement like pageants, religious worship, and the
sharing of meals. These three themes—the dissenting assembly, the
public assembly, and the expressive assembly—emerge from the
groups that have gathered throughout our nation’s history. Theirs is the
story of the forgotten freedom of assembly.16
16. My characterization of dissenting, public, and expressive assembly bears some
resemblance to Timothy Zick’s emphasis on the relationship between expression and physical
space. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009). Zick observes, “In First Amendment doctrine and
scholarship, place has generally been treated as a background principle, not a fundamental
aspect of assembly, expression, and other public liberties.” Id. at 8. He responds that “places
ground and give meaning to lives, activities, and cultures.” Id. at 10. My argument for
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY

I begin with the text of the First Amendment and with a textual
observation. As a historical matter, we should not make too much of
slight variations in wording, grammar, and punctuation in constitutional clauses.17 There is little indication that the Framers applied our
level of exegetical scrutiny to the texts that they considered and
created. But because modern constitutional law parses wording so
carefully, our current arguments are in many ways constrained by the
precise text handed down to us. And so it is for this reason a useful
exercise to consider forensically the text that has survived, as well as
the text that did not.

A. The Common Good
The most important aspect of the clause containing the
constitutional right of assembly may be three words missing from its
final formulation: the common good. Had antecedent versions of the
assembly clause prevailed in the debates over the Bill of Rights and
lawful assembly been limited to purposes serving the common good,
the kinds of marginalized and disfavored groups that have sought
refuge in its protections may have met with little success. Assembly
for the common good would have endorsed the consensus narrative
advanced by mid-twentieth century pluralism: we tolerate groups only
to the extent that they serve the common good and thereby strengthen
the stability and vitality of democracy.18 The Framers decided
otherwise.
When the First Congress convened in 1789 to draft amendments
to the Constitution, it considered proposals submitted by the various
states. Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical amendments
covering the rights of assembly and petition: “That the people have a
assembly builds upon Zick’s theoretical approach by considering practices as well as places in
the background that gives coherence to meaning.
17. Caleb Nelson cautions against placing too much reliance on punctuation in the
Constitution because at the time of the Founding “punctuation marks [were] thought to lack
the legal status of words.” Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 258 (2000). He
notes that “[t]he ratification of the Constitution by the states reflects this relatively casual
attitude toward punctuation” because many states that incorporated a copy of the Constitution
in the official form of ratification varied its punctuation. Id. at 258 n.102. Nelson cites as an
example the copy of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania form of ratification, which used
“different punctuation marks than the Constitution engrossed at the Federal Convention” in
roughly thirty-five places. Id.
18. For a critique of the consensus narrative and its relationship to the constitutional
right of association, see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of
Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good,
or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right
to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances.”19
New York and Rhode Island offered slightly different wording,
emphasizing that the people assembled for “their” common good
rather than “the” common good: “That the people have a right
peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to
instruct their Representatives; and that every [person] has a right to
petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.”20
On June 8, 1789, James Madison’s proposal to the House favored
the possessive pronoun over the definite article: “The people shall not
be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their
common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or
remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”21
Whether intentional or not, the endorsement of the common good
of the people who assemble rather than the common good of the state
signaled the possibility that the interests of the people assembled need
not be coterminous with the interests of those in power.
The point was not lost during the House debates. When Thomas
Hartley of Pennsylvania contended that, with respect to assembly,
“every thing that was not incompatible with the general good ought to
be granted,”22 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts replied that if Hartley
“supposed that the people had a right to consult for the common good”
but “could not consult unless they met for the purpose,” he was in fact
“contend[ing] for nothing.”23 In other words, if the right of assembly
encompassed only the common good from the perspective of the state,
then its use as a means of protest or dissent would be eviscerated.24
On August 19, 1789, the House approved a version of the
amendment that retained the reference to “their common good” and
also incorporated the rights of speech and press: “The freedom of
19. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
140 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. This language is
substantially similar to declarations in North Carolina and Pennsylvania in 1776 that “the
People have a Right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their
Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature for Redress of Grievances.” Id. at 141.
20. Id. at 140.
21. Id. at 129.
22. Id. at 145 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
23. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
24. Cf. Melvin Rishe, Freedom of Assembly, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 337 (1965)
(“Were the courts truly bound to delve into whether or not an assembly served the common
good, it is likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the constitution
would lose this protection.”).
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speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the
government for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”25
Eleven days later, the Senate defeated a motion to strike the
reference to the common good.26 But the following week, the text
inexplicably dropped out when the Senate merged language pertaining
to religion into the draft amendment: “Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the
free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to
the government for the redress of grievances.”27

B.

Assembly and Petition

The striking of the reference to the common good may have been
intended to broaden the scope of the assembly clause, but it also
introduced a textual ambiguity. Without the prepositional “for their
common good” following the reference to assembly, the text now
described “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”28 This left
ambiguous whether the amendment recognized a single right to
assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government or whether it
established both an unencumbered right of assembly and a separate
right of petition.
In one of the only recent considerations of assembly in the First
Amendment, Jason Mazzone argues in favor of the former.29 Mazzone
suggests:
25. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This version also changed the semicolon after “common good” to a comma.
26. S. Journal, 1st Cong., 70 (Sept. 3, 1789). The following day the Senate adopted
similar language: “That Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common
good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Id. at 70-71 (Sept. 4, 1789)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 77 (Sept. 9, 1789). The amendment took its final form on September 24,
1789: “Congress shall make no Law respecting an establishment of Religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 136 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
28. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. The only recent article to address the history of free assembly other than
Mazzone’s is Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543
(2009).
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There are two clues that we should understand assembly and petition to
belong together. The first clue is the use of “and to petition,” which
contrasts with the use of “or” in the remainder of the First Amendment’s
language. The second clue is the use of “right,” in the singular (as in
“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition”), rather
than the plural “rights” (as in “the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition”). The prohibitions on Congress’ power can
therefore be understood as prohibitions with respect to speech, press,
30
and assembly in order to petition the government.

Mazzone’s interpretation is problematic because the comma preceding
the phrase “and to petition” appears to be residual from the earlier text
that had described the “right of the people peaceably to assemble and
consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for a
redress of grievances.”31 Whether left in deliberately or inadvertently, it
relates back to a distinction between a right to peaceable assembly and
a right to petition.32 Moreover, at least some members of the First
Congress appeared to have conceived of a broader notion of assembly,
as evidenced in an exchange between Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts and John Page of Virginia.

30. Mazzone, supra note 29, at 712-13 (internal citations omitted). But see AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 26 (1998) (referring to
assembly and petition as separate clauses); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 32 (2d ed. 1995) (referring to a distinct “‘peaceably to assemble’
clause”); JAMES E. LEAHY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1791-1991: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF
FREEDOM 202 (1991) (“The final wording of the First Amendment indicates that the first
Congress intended to protect the right of the people to assemble for whatever purposes and at
the same time to be assured of a separate right to petition the government if they chose to do
so.”).
31. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143. The earlier version
derived in turn from Madison’s draft. Id. at 129. Mazzone recognizes that “in Madison’s
draft, assembly is separated from petitioning by a semi-colon, perhaps indicating that while
the right of assembly is related to the right of petition, assembly is not necessarily limited to
formulating petitions.” Mazzone, supra note 29, at 715 n.409.
32. Mazzone addresses the comma in a footnote and argues that because it “mirrors
the comma” preceding the words “or prohibit the free exercise thereof ” in the first half of the
First Amendment, “[i]t does not therefore signal a right of petition separate from the right of
assembly.” Id. at 713 n.392 (internal quotation marks omitted). The argument for textual
parallelism does not hold because the free exercise clause explicitly refers back to “religion”
(before the comma) with the word “thereof.” A closer parallel—which illustrates Mazzone’s
interpretive problem—is the suggestion that the comma separating speech and press connotes
that they embody only a singular freedom. My quibbles with Mazzone do not diminish my
appreciation for his work. Mazzone is one of the few scholars in recent years to notice the
relationship between assembly and association, and his thoughtful article posits a number of
ideas with which I am highly sympathetic. See, e.g., id. at 646 (arguing that assembly and
petition provide “a much firmer constitutional basis for protecting the rights of citizens to
come together in collective activities” than “expressive association”).
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During the House debates over the language of the Bill of Rights,
Sedgwick criticized the proposed right of assembly as redundant in
light of the freedom of speech: “If people freely converse together,
they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable
right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would
be called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to
descend to such minutiae.”33
Page responded:
[Sedgwick] supposes [the right of assembly] no more essential than
whether a man has a right to wear his hat or not, but let me observe to
him that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to
pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people
have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful
occasions, therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of
authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights; if the
people could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext
whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege contained
34
in the clause.

Irving Brant notes that while Page’s allusion to a man without a hat is
lost on a contemporary audience, “[t]he mere reference to it was
equivalent to half an hour of oratory” before the First Congress.35 Page
was referring to the trial of William Penn.36
On August 14, 1670, Penn and other Quakers had attempted to
gather for worship at their meeting-house on Gracechurch Street,
London, in violation of the 1664 Conventicle Act that forbade any
Nonconformists attending a religious meeting, or assembling themselves together to the number of more than five persons in addition to
members of the family, for any religious purpose not according to the
rules of the Church of England.37 Prevented from entering by a
company of soldiers, Penn began delivering a sermon to the Quakers
assembled in the street. Penn and a fellow Quaker, William Mead,
were arrested and brought to trial in a dramatic sequence of events that
included a contempt of court charge stemming from their wearing of
hats in the courtroom.38 A jury acquitted the two men on the charge
33. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143-44.
34. Id. at 144 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
35. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 55 (1965).
36. Id. at 54-61.
37. Conventicle Act, 1664, 16 Car. 2, c. 4 (Eng.).
38. BRANT, supra note 35, at 57 (quoting Penn’s journal). Penn and Mead were fined
for contempt of court for wearing their hats after being ordered by an officer of the court to
put them on. Id.
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that their public worship constituted an unlawful assembly. The case
gained renown throughout England and the American colonies.39
According to Brant:
William Penn loomed large in American history, but even if he had
never crossed the Atlantic, bringing the Quaker religion with him,
Americans would have known about his “tumultuous assembly” and his
hat. Few pamphlets of the seventeenth century had more avid readers
than the one entitled “The People’s Ancient and Just Liberties, asserted,
in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead at the Old Bailey, 22
Charles II 1670, written by themselves.” Congressman Page had
known the story from boyhood, reproduced in Emlyn’s State Trials to
which his father subscribed in 1730. It was available, both in the State
Trials and as a pamphlet, to the numerous congressmen who had used
the facilities of the City Library of Philadelphia. Madison had an
account of it written by Sir John Hawles, a libertarian lawyer who
40
became Solicitor General after the overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688.

Congressman Page’s allusion to Penn made clear that the right of
assembly under discussion in the House encompassed more than
meeting to petition for redress of grievances: Penn’s ordeal had
nothing to do with petition; it was an act of religious worship. After
Page spoke, the House defeated Sedgwick’s motion to strike assembly
from the draft amendment by a “considerable majority.”41 On
September 24, 1789, the Senate approved the amendment in its final
form, and the subsequent ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791
enacted “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”42
The text handed down to us thus conveys a broad notion of
assembly in two ways. First, it does not limit the purposes of assembly
to the common good, thereby implicitly allowing assembly for
purposes that might be antithetical to that good (although constraining
assembly to peaceable means). Second, it does not limit assembly to
the purposes of petitioning the government, which means that the
constitutional expression of assembly may take many forms for many
39. In addition to its pronouncement on the right of assembly, the case became an
important precedent for the independence of juries. Following their verdict of acquittal, the
trial judge had imprisoned the jurors, who were later vindicated in habeas corpus
proceedings.
40. BRANT, supra note 35, at 55-56 (emphasis omitted).
41. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 145 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 761 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
42. “Congress shall make no Law respecting an establishment of Religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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purposes. Neither of these broad interpretations of the right to
assembly has been readily acknowledged in legal and political
discourse. But the larger vision of assembly can be found in the
practices of people who have gathered throughout American history. It
is to these practices that I now turn.
III. THE FIRST TEST OF ASSEMBLY: THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN
SOCIETIES
The nascent freedom of assembly faced an early challenge when
the first sustained political dissent in the new republic emerged out of
the increasingly partisan divide between Federalists and Republicans.
By the summer of 1792, Republican concern over the Federalist
administration and its perceived support of the British in their conflict
with the French had reached new levels of agitation. The Republicanleaning National Gazette began calling for the creation of voluntary
“constitutional” and “political” societies to critique the Washington
administration.43
The first society was organized in Philadelphia in March of
1793.44 Over the next three years, dozens more emerged throughout
most of the major cities in the United States.45 These “DemocraticRepublican” societies consisted largely of farmers and laborers wary
of the aristocratic leanings of Hamilton and other Federalists, but they
also included lawyers, doctors, publishers, and government
employees.46 The largest society—the Democratic Society of
Pennsylvania—boasted over three hundred members.47
The societies “invariably proclaimed the right of citizens to
assemble.”48 A 1794 resolution from a society in Washington, North
Carolina, asserted: “It is the unalienable right of a free and
43. Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the
Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1536 n.46
(2004). Mazzone also highlights the importance of the Democratic-Republican Societies to
early interpretations of assembly and association. Mazzone, supra note 29, at 734-42.
44. Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies: An Introduction, in THE
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF
CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND TOASTS 6 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1976).
45. Although the exact number is disputed, there were probably around forty
societies. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1537 n.52.
46. Foner, supra note 44, at 7; EUGENE PERRY LINK, DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN
SOCIETIES, 1790-1800, at 71-74 (Octagon Books 1965) (1942); Chesney, supra note 43, at
1538 n.54. The term “Democratic-Republican Societies” comes from historians. Chesney,
supra note 43, at 1527 n.5.
47. Foner, supra note 44, at 7.
48. Id. at 11.
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independent people to assemble together in a peaceable manner to
discuss with firmness and freedom all subjects of public concern.”49
That same year, Boston’s Independent Chronicle declared:
Under a Constitution which expressly provides “That the people have a
right in an orderly and peaceable manner to assemble and consult upon
the common good,” there can be no necessity for an apology to the
public for an Association of a number of citizens to promote and
cherish the social virtues, the love of their country and a respect for its
50
Laws and Constitutions.

The societies usually met monthly, although more frequently
during elections or times of political crisis.51 According to Philip
Foner, a large part of their activities consisted of “creating public
discussions; composing, adopting, and issuing circulars, memorials,
resolutions, and addresses to the people; and remonstrances to the
President and the Congress—all expressing the feelings of the
assembled groups on current political issues.”52 But in addition to
meeting to discuss political issues, the societies also joined in the
“extraordinarily diverse array of . . . feasts, festivals, and parades” that
unfolded in the streets and public places of American cities.53
Collectively, the activities of the societies “embodied an understanding
of popular sovereignty and representation in which the role of the
citizen was not limited to periodic voting, but instead entailed active
and constant engagement in political life.”54 As Simon Newman’s
study of popular celebrations of this era observes, these kinds of
gatherings were self-consciously political expressions:
Festive culture required both participants and an audience, and by
printing and reprinting accounts of July Fourth celebrations and the like
newspapers contributed to a greatly enlarged sense of audience: by the
49. Id. (quoting NORTH-CAROLINA GAZETTE (New Bern), Apr. 19, 1794).
50. Id. at 25 (quoting INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Jan. 16, 1794). It is
unclear what authority the paper is quoting—the italicized text is not from the Constitution.
51. Id. at 10. El-Haj notes that “the centrality of large gatherings of people in public
spaces as part of the election festivities—to eat, drink, and parade and by implication to
affirm their role as participants in the new nation.” El-Haj, supra note 29, at 555.
52. Foner, supra note 44, at 10.
53. SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE CULTURE
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2 (1997). These rituals were “vital elements of political
life” practiced by ordinary Americans in the early republic. Id. at 5. While Newman cautions
that some participants may have been interested only in “the festive aspects of public
occasions and holidays,” he writes that it was “all but impossible for these people, whatever
their original motives for taking part, to avoid making public political statements by and
through their participation: both their presence and their participation involve some degree of
politicization and an expression of political identity and power in a public setting.” Id. at 8-9.
54. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1539.
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end of the 1790s those who participated in these events knew that their
actions were quite likely going to be read about and interpreted by
55
citizens far beyond the confines of their own community.

Celebrations of the French Revolution took on an especially partisan
character when members and supporters of the emerging Federalist
party refused to participate in them.56 Without the endorsement of the
Federalist government, Republicans “were forced to foster alternative
ways of validating celebrations that were often explicitly oppositional.”57 In doing so, they characterized their tributes as representing
the unified views of the entire community rather than just political
elites. Newman writes:
The result of the Democratic Republican stratagem was that members
of subordinate groups—including women, the poor, and black
Americans, all of whom were excluded from or had strictly
circumscribed roles in the white male contests over July Fourth and
Washington’s birthday celebrations—found a larger role for themselves
in French Revolutionary celebrations than in any of the other rites and
58
festivals of the early American republic.

The relatively egalitarian gestures of these celebrations were not well
received by Federalists, who berated the women who participated in
them with sarcasm and derision and raised fears about black
participation.59
Federalists became increasingly agitated with the growing
popular appeal of the societies. The pages of the pro-Federalist
Gazette of the United States repeatedly warned that the societies were
fostering disruptive tendencies and instigating rebellion.60 And while
there was little basis in fact to suggest that the societies were behind
the Whiskey Rebellion, the Federalist press was quick to highlight that
several members of societies in western Pennsylvania had been
actively involved in the insurrection.61
President Washington came to believe that the widespread public
condemnation of the rebellion had created a political opportunity for

55. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 3.
56. Id. at 120.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 122. It is important not to overstate these egalitarian glimpses. The officers
of the societies were “virtually without exception men of considerable substance.” STANLEY
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 458 (1993).
59. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 128-30.
60. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1546.
61. Id. at 1557-58.
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the “annihilation” of the societies.62 He had been incensed by their
organized opposition to the whiskey tax, writing in a personal letter
that while “no one denies the right of the people to meet occasionally,
to petition for, or to remonstrate against, any Act of the Legislature,”
nothing could be “more absurd, more arrogant, or more pernicious to
the peace of Society, than for . . . a self created permanent body” that
would pass judgment on such acts.63 Washington took clear aim at the
societies in his annual address to Congress on November 19, 1794,
asserting that “associations of men” and “certain self-created societies”
had fostered the violent rebellion.64 Robert Chesney suggests that
“[t]he speech was widely understood at the time not as ordinary
political criticism, but instead as a denial of the legality of organized
and sustained political dissent.”65 And Irving Brant observes that “[t]he
damning epithet ‘self-created’ indorsed the current notion that
ordinary people had no right to come together for political purposes.”66
The Federalist-controlled Senate quickly censured the societies in
response to Washington’s address. The House, in contrast, began an
extended debate about the wording of its response, and assigned James
Madison, Theodore Sedgwick, and Thomas Scott to draft a reply. The
Federalist Sedgwick, who years earlier had suggested that the freedom
of assembly was so “self-evident” and “unalienable” that its inclusion
in the constitutional amendments was unnecessary,67 now argued in
spite of the First Amendment that the societies’ efforts to organize
were effectively illegal.68 After four days of debate, Madison contended that a House censure would be a “severe punishment” and would
have dire consequences for the future of free expression.69 The final
language in the House response was substantially more muted than
that issued by the Senate.
Following Washington’s address and the congressional response,
“[s]pirited debates concerning the legitimacy of the societies were

62. Id. at 1559 (quoting Letter from President George Washington to Governor Henry
Lee (Aug. 26, 1794), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 475 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1940)).
63. Id. at 1526 (quoting Letter from President George Washington to Burges Ball
(Sept. 25, 1794), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 62, at 506.
64. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 788 (1794) (statement of President George Washington).
65. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1561.
66. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, 417
(1950).
67. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143-44.
68. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1562-63.
69. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison).

2010]

FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

581

conducted in every community where a society existed.”70 Due in part
to Washington’s wide popularity, public opinion turned the corner
against the societies. Many of them folded completely within a year of
the President’s speech, and by the end of the decade, all had been
driven out of existence.71 Yet despite their relatively short duration, the
societies’ influence was not inconsequential. According to Foner, “As
a center of Republican agitation and propaganda . . . the societies did
much to forge the sword that defeated Federalism and put Jefferson in
the presidency.”72 They did so through public and political activities,
physical and communal gatherings that displayed their enthusiasm and
sought to sway public opinion. But as significant as these first
assertions of assembly were the heavy handed political attacks against
them. The vigorous resistance to the claims of the people assembled
from those in power demonstrated the precarious nature of dissenting
groups in the new republic.
IV. ASSEMBLY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA
In spite of the government’s response to the DemocraticRepublican societies, the idea that the people could assemble apart
from the sanction of the state continued to take hold in early American
political life. Benjamin Oliver’s 1832 treatise, The Rights of an
American Citizen, called the right of assembly “one of the strongest
safeguards, against any usurpation or tyrannical abuse of power, so
long as the people collectively have sufficient discernment to perceive
what is best for the public interest, and individually have independence
enough, to express an opinion in opposition to a popular but designing
leader.”73 Writing in 1838, the state theorist Francis Lieber described
“those many extra-constitutional, not unconstitutional, meetings, in
which the citizens either unite their scattered means for the obtaining
of some common end, social in general, or political in particular, or
express their opinion in definite resolutions upon some important
70. Foner, supra note 44, at 33.
71. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1528.
72. Foner, supra note 44, at 40.
73. BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 187 (1832). Oliver
limited his conception of assembly to discussions of “public measures.” Id. at 195. His
lukewarm description warned that assemblies “called on the most unexceptionable business”
to serve “chiefly as occasions for haranguing the people, and exciting their passions by loud
and florid declamation, delivered with the regulated and precise gesture of the academy, and
with all the generous and glowing ardor of holiday patriotism” but are nevertheless “a great
improvement on the affrays, tumults, riots and public disturbances, which in many countries
invariably attend numerous and irregular assemblies of the people.” Id.
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point before the people.”74 These “public meetings” were undertaken
for a variety of purposes:
[T]hey are of great importance in order to direct public attention to
subjects of magnitude, to test the opinion of the community, to inform
persons at a distance, representatives or the administration, for instance,
of the state of public opinion on certain measures, whether yet
depending or adopted; to resolve upon and adopt petitions; to
encourage individuals or bodies of men in arduous undertakings
requiring the moral support of well-expressed public approbation; to
effect a union with others, striving for the same ends; to disseminate
knowledge by way of reports of committees; to form societies for
charitable purposes or the melioration of laws or institutions; to
sanction by the spontaneous expression of the opinion of the
community measures not strictly agreeing with the letter of the law, but
enforced by necessity; to call upon the services of individuals who
otherwise would not feel warranted to appear before the public and
invite its attention, or feel authorized to interfere with a subject not
strictly lying within their proper sphere of action; to concert upon more
or less extensive measures of public utility, and whatever else their
75
object may be.

A generation later, John Alexander Jameson referred to “wholly
unofficial” gatherings and “spontaneous assemblages” that were
protected by the right of peaceable assembly, a “common and most
invaluable provision of our constitutions, State and Federal.”76 These
assemblies were “at once the effects and the causes of social life and
activity, doing for the state what the waves do for the sea: they prevent
stagnation, the precursor of decay and death.”77 They were “public
opinion in the making—public opinion fit to be the basis of political
action, because sound and wise, and not a mere echo of party cries and
platforms.”78
The significance of free assembly to public opinion was not lost
on policymakers in southern states, who routinely prohibited its
exercise among slaves and free blacks. A 1792 Georgia law restricted

74. 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS: DESIGNED CHIEFLY FOR THE
USE OF COLLEGES AND STUDENTS AT LAW 295 (2d ed. 1881).
75. Id. at 296. Lieber refers to “public meetings” at 471.
76. JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS:
THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 4-5, 104 (4th ed. 1887). Jameson also
refers to “spontaneous conventions” and “spontaneous assemblages.” Id. at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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slaves from assembling “on pretense of feasting.”79 In South Carolina,
an 1800 law forbade “slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes”
from assembling for “mental instruction or religious worship.”80 An
1804 Virginia statute made any meeting of slaves at night an unlawful
assembly.81 In 1831, the Virginia Legislature declared “[a]ll meetings
of free Negroes or mulattoes at any school house, church, meeting
house or other place for teaching them reading or writing, either in the
day or the night” to be an unlawful assembly.82
The restrictions on assembly intensified following Nat Turner’s
1831 rebellion in Southampton County, Virginia, which resulted in the
deaths of fifty-seven white men, women, and children. Turner’s
insurrection sent Virginia and other southern states into a panic.83
Virginia Governor John Floyd made the rebellion the central theme of
his December 5, 1831, address to the Legislature.84 Floyd thought that
black preachers were behind a broader conspiracy for insurrection and
had acquired “great ascendancy over the minds of their fellows.”85 He
argued that these preachers had to be silenced “because, full of
ignorance, they were incapable of inculcating anything but notions of
the wildest superstition, thus preparing fit instruments in the hands of
crafty agitators, to destroy the public tranquility.”86 In response, the
Legislature strengthened Virginia’s black code by imposing additional
restrictions on assembly for religious worship.87

79. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d
ed. 1853).
80. Id. (emphasis omitted).
81. JUNE PURCELL GUILD, BLACK LAWS OF VIRGINIA: A SUMMARY OF THE
LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF VIRGINIA CONCERNING NEGROES FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT
71 (1936).
82. Id. at 175-76 (citing VIRGINIA LAWS 1831, ch. XXXIX).
83. See generally John W. Cromwell, The Aftermath of Nat Turner’s Insurrection, 5 J.
NEGRO HIST. 208 (1920).
84. Id. at 218, 223.
85. Id. at 218.
86. Id. at 219 (quoting The Journal of the House of Delegates 9, 10 (1831)).
87. Id. at 230; see GUILD, supra note 81, at 106-07 (“[N]o slave, free Negro or
mulatto shall preach, or hold any meeting for religious purposes either day or night.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In 1848, chapter 120 of the Criminal Code decreed: “It is an
unlawful assembly of slaves, free Negroes or mulattoes for the purpose of religious worship
when such worship is conducted by a slave, free Negro, or mulatto, and every such assembly
for the purpose of instruction in reading and writing, by whomsoever conducted, and every
such assembly in the night time, under whatsoever pretext.” Id. at 178-79. The law also
stated that “[a]ny white person assembly with slaves or free Negroes for purpose of
instructing them to read or write, or associating with them in any unlawful assembly, shall be
confined in jail not exceeding six months and fined not exceeding $100.00.” Id. at 179.
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Concern over Turner’s rebellion also spawned additional
restrictions on the assembly of slaves and free blacks in Maryland,
Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama.88 By 1835, “most
southern states had outlawed the right of assembly and organization by
free blacks, prohibited them from holding church services without a
white clergyman present, required their adherence to slave curfews,
and minimized their contact with slaves.”89 In 1836, Theodore Dwight
Weld aptly referred to the oppressive restrictions on blacks as “‘the
right of peaceably assembling’ violently wrested.”90
James Smith’s slave narrative highlights the importance of
assembly for religious worship and the felt impact of its loss:
The way in which we worshiped is almost indescribable. The singing
was accompanied by a certain ecstasy of motion, clapping of hands,
tossing of heads, which would continue without cessation about half an
hour; one would lead off in a kind of recitative style, others joining in
the chorus. The old house partook of the ecstasy; it rang with their
jubilant shouts, and shook in all its joints. . . . When Nat. Turner’s
insurrection broke out, the colored people were forbidden to hold
91
meetings among themselves.

The collective restrictions on assembly did not simply silence political
dissent in a narrow sense: they were an assault on an entire way of life,
suppressing worship, education, and community among slave and free
African Americans.92
While southern states increased their efforts to suppress the
freedom of assembly for African Americans, abolitionists in the North
expanded their reliance on the constitutional right to spread their
message. And because many abolitionists were women, freedom of
assembly was “indelibly linked with the woman’s rights movement

Cromwell, supra note 83, at 231-33.
1 C. PETER RIPLEY, THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 443 n.9 (1985).
Theodore Dwight Weld, The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of
Columbia (1838), reprinted in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 271 (Collier Books
1965) (1951). Jacobus tenBroek has described Weld’s tract as “a restatement and synthesis of
abolitionist constitutional theory as of that time.” Id. at 243 (emphasis omitted); see also
HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). Akhil Amar writes that
the right of assembly for religious worship was “a core right that southern states had
violated.” AMAR, supra note 30, at 245.
91. NAT TURNER 74 (Eric Foner ed., 1971) (quoting JAMES L. SMITH,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JAMES L. SMITH 27-30 (1881)).
92. William Goodell’s 1853 book, The American Slave Code, observed that
“[r]eligious liberty is the precursor of civil and political liberty and enfranchisement.”
GOODELL, supra note 79, at 328.
88.
89.
90.
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from its genesis in the abolition movement.”93 Female abolitionists and
suffragists organized their efforts around a particular form of
assembly: the convention. The turn to the convention was not
accidental. Between 1830 and 1860, official conventions accompanied
revisions to constitutions in almost every state.94 The focus of these
official conventions on rights and freedoms provided a natural
springboard for “spontaneous conventions” to criticize the blatant
racial and gender inequalities perpetuated by the state constitutions.95
Women held antislavery conventions in New York in 1837 and in
Philadelphia in 1838 and 1839.96 Two years after the 1848 Woman’s
Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, and less than a month
before the official convention to revise the Ohio Constitution, a group
of women assembled in Salem, Ohio, to call for equal rights to all
people “‘without distinction of sex or color.’”97 As Nancy Isenberg
describes:
[T]he Salem forum stood apart from the American political tradition.
Activists used the meeting to critique politics as usual. Women
occupied the floor and debated resolutions and gave speeches, while the
men sat quietly in the gallery. Through a poignant reversal of gender
roles, the women engaged in constitutional deliberation, and the men
98
were relegated to the sidelines of political action.

In other words, the very form of the convention conveyed the suffragist
message of equality and disruption of the existing order.
Women’s conventions often met with harsh resistance. When
Angelina and Sarah Grimké toured New England on a campaign for
the American Anti Slavery Society in 1837, they were rebuked for
lecturing before “promiscuous audiences.”99 The following year,
Philadelphia newspapers helped inspire a riotous disruption of the
Convention of American Women Against Slavery that ended in the
burning of Pennsylvania Hall.100 The participants of the 1850 Salem

93. LINDA J. LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT OF
ASSEMBLY, at xxiii (1997). Lumsden has suggested that “virtually the entire suffrage story
can be told through the prism of the right of assembly.” Id. at 144.
94. NANCY ISENBERG, SEX AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 16 (1998).
95. Id.
96. THE ABOLITIONIST SISTERHOOD: WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA, at ix (Jean Fagan Yellin & John C. VanHorne eds., 1994).
97. ISENBERG, supra note 94, at 15 (quoting “To the Women of Ohio,” ANTI-SLAVERY
BUGLE, Mar. 30, 1850, at 114).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
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convention were denied the use of the local school and church.101 An
1853 women’s rights convention at the Broadway Tabernacle in New
York degenerated into a shouting match when hecklers interrupted the
speakers. Rather than criticize the disruptive crowd, the New York
Herald sardonically characterized the gathering as the “Women’s
Wrong Convention” and quipped that “[t]he assemblage of rampant
women which convened at the Tabernacle yesterday was an interesting
phase in the comic history of the nineteenth century.”102 The following
year, the Sunday Times published an editorial that used racial and
sexual slurs to describe the national women’s rights convention in
Philadelphia.103 Isenberg intimates that proponents of these attacks
believed that “women’s unchecked freedom of assembly mocked all
the restraints of civilized society.”104
A striking example of the importance of free assembly to
politically unpopular causes in the antebellum area occurred in 1835,
when the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society invited William Lloyd
Garrison and the British abolitionist George Thompson to speak at its
annual meeting. Antiabolitionists reviled Thompson, calling him an
“artful, cowardly fellow” who “always throws himself under the
protection of the female portion of his audience when in danger.”105
The Society originally scheduled its meeting to take place in Congress
Hall, but the lessee rescinded his offer after concluding that “not the
rabble” but “the most influential and respectable men in the community” intended to “make trouble” if Thompson spoke.106 The Society
responded to the lessee’s rescission with a letter to the editor of the
Boston Courier asserting:
This association does firmly and respectfully declare, that it is our right,
and we will maintain it in Christian meekness, but with Christian
constancy, to hold meetings, and to employ such lecturers as we judge
best calculated to advance the holy cause of human rights; even though
such lecturers should chance to be foreigners. It comes with an ill grace
from those who boast an English ancestry, to object to our choice on
this occasion: still less should the sons of the pilgrim fathers invoke the
spirit of outrageous violence on the daughters of the noble female band

101. LUMSDEN, supra note 93, at xxvi.
102. Id. at xxvii (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. ISENBERG, supra note 94, at 46.
104. Id.
105. REPORT OF THE BOSTON FEMALE ANTI SLAVERY SOCIETY 12 (1836) (quoting
BOSTON COM. GAZETTE).
106. Id. at 11.
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who shared their conflict with public opinion;—their struggle with
difficulty and danger. The cause of freedom is the same in all ages.
. . . We must meet together, to strengthen ourselves to discharge our
duty as the mothers of the next generation—as the wives and sisters of
107
this.

The editor of the Boston Courier appended his own comments to the
Society’s letter:
When before, in this city, or in any other, did a benevolent association
of ladies, publicly invite an itinerant vagabond—a hired foreign
incendiary—to insult their countrymen and fellow-citizens, and to
kindle the flames of discord between different members of the Union?
Would not our friends of the Female Anti Slavery Society do well to
cast the beams out of their own eyes, before they waste their pathos
108
upon a justly indignant public?

The Society rescheduled its meeting for October 21, 1835, a week
after its initial meeting date. The meeting would now take place at the
offices of Garrison’s The Liberator. Anti-abolitionists circulated a
handbill that was duly printed in the Boston Commercial Gazette:
That infamous foreign scoundrel THOMPSON, will hold forth this
afternoon, at the Liberator Office, No. 46 Washington street. The
present is a fair opportunity for the friends of the Union to snake
Thompson out! It will be a contest between the abolitionists and the
friends of the Union. A purse of $100 has been raised by a number of
patriotic citizens to reward the individual who shall first lay violent
hands on Thompson, so that he may be brought to the tar kettle before
109
dark. Friends of the Union, be vigilant!

The Society went forward with its meeting in spite of the threat. A
large crowd gathered and soon turned riotous. Unable to find
Thompson, some of them called for Garrison’s lynching. Garrison
fled through a back entrance and barely escaped with his life.110
Reflecting on the harrowing experience in the November 7, 1835
edition of The Liberator, Garrison lambasted the instigators of the riot
in an editorial entitled Triumph of Mobocracy in Boston:
Yes, to accommodate their selfishness, they declared that the liberty of
speech, and the right to assemble in an associated capacity peaceably
together, should be unlawfully and forcibly taken away from an
107.
108.
109.
110.
(1963).

Id. at 24-25 (quoting BOSTON COURIER).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-28 (quoting BOSTON COM. GAZETTE (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See generally JOHN L. THOMAS, THE LIBERATOR: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON
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estimable portion of the community, by the officers of our city—the
humble servants of the people! Benedict Arnold’s treachery to the
111
cause of liberty and his bleeding country was no worse than this.

The Boston mob “became a cause célèbre among abolitionists who
defended their right to free speech and assembly.”112 But fifteen years
later, when Thompson returned to Boston to address the Massachusetts
Anti-Slavery Society in Faneuil Hall, he was again driven away by a
mob.113 Frederick Douglass referred to the latter incident as the
“mobocratic violence” that had “disgraced the city of Boston.”114 In an
1850 address delivered in Rochester, New York, Douglass decried
“[t]hese violent demonstrations, these outrageous invasions of human
rights” and argued:
It is a significant fact, that while meetings for almost any purpose under
heaven may be held unmolested in the city of Boston, that in the same
city, a meeting cannot be peaceably held for the purpose of preaching
the doctrine of the American Declaration of Independence, “that all
115
men are created equal.”

As Akhil Amar has observed, the nineteenth century movements
of the disenfranchised brought “a different lived experience” to the
words of the First Amendment’s assembly clause.116 They were
political movements, to be sure, but they embodied and symbolized
even larger societal and cultural challenges. They met with slanderous
media coverage, blatant racial and sexual slurs, and even outright
violence, visceral reminders of the importance of protecting free
assembly from those who would seek to deny it.
V.

ASSEMBLY MISCONSTRUED

Courts and commentators lost sight of the lived history of
assembly, due in part to a judicial misreading of the text of the First
Amendment’s assembly clause. The interpretive problem began in the
1876 decision, United States v. Cruikshank.117 The primary legal

111. WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 377 (1852).
112. 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 166 n.17 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991).
113. FREDERICK DOUGLASS SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES AND INTERVIEWS, in 2
THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, 1847-54, at 268 n.14 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982).
114. Id. at 267.
115. Id. at 268-67.
116. AMAR, supra note 30, at 246.
117. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank unfolded in the aftermath of the 1873 Colfax
Massacre in Grant Parish, Louisiana. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE
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principle articulated in Cruikshank was that private citizens could not
be prosecuted for denying the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly
to other citizens.118 But Cruikshank’s dictum proved more significant
than its holding. Reiterating that the First Amendment established a
narrow right enforceable only against the federal government, Chief
Justice Waite wrote:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of,
119
and guaranteed by, the United States.

In context, it is likely that Waite was merely listing petition as an
example of the kind of assembly protected against infringement by the
federal government. The Constitution also guaranteed assembly “for
any thing else connected with the powers of the duties of the national
government,” which was as broadly as the right of assembly could be
applied prior to its incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment.120 But Waite’s reference to “[t]he right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances” came close to the text of the First Amendment.
Read in isolation from his qualifying language, the dictum could be
erroneously construed as limiting assembly to the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances.121
Ten years after Cruikshank, Justice William Woods made
precisely this interpretive mistake in Presser v. Illinois.122 Woods
concluded that Cruikshank had announced that the First Amendment
protected the right to assemble only if “the purpose of the assembly
was to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”123 Presser
COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008)
(chronicling the horrific events of the massacre).
118. The holding is consistent with a contemporary understanding of most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights.
119. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
120. Id. at 542. It is, of course, possible to read the text so that the additional clause
modifies “petitioning” rather than “assemble,” as if Waite were referring to “[t]he right of the
people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for any thing else
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government” rather than “[t]he right
of the people peaceably to assemble for any thing else connected with the powers or the
duties of the national government.” Either way, the sentence cannot be read as limiting
assembly to petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances.
121. Id.
122. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
123. Id. at 267.
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is the only time that the Supreme Court has expressly limited the right
of assembly in this way.124 But Woods’s interpretation has persisted in
decades of scholarship.125
VI. ASSEMBLY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
In spite of the Court’s misconstrual of assembly, the people
claiming the right to assemble insisted on a broader purpose and
meaning. This thicker sense of assembly is most evident during the
Progressive Era in three emerging political movements: a revitalized
women’s movement, a surge in political activity among African
Americans, and an increasingly agitated labor movement. In the early
decades of the twentieth century, these groups turned to the freedom of
assembly as an important guarantee of their ability to dissent and
advocate for change. In doing so, they insisted that their public
gatherings were no less political than the institutional structures they
criticized. They brought together people in physical forms that both
displayed and symbolized a unified purpose. Their histories are
124. Justice Fuller made a passing reference to “the right of the people to assemble
and petition the government for a redress of grievances” in United States ex rel Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904). The Court has since contradicted the view that assembly
and petition comprise one right. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (referring
to “the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances”
(emphasis added)); cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(The First Amendment “has not generally been thought to protect the right peaceably to
assemble only when the purpose of the assembly is to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.”).
125. See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial
Technique, 46 VA. L. REV. 730, 736 (1960) (“[Cruikshank was the] first case to construe . . .
freedom of assembly to mean the right to assemble in order to petition the government.”);
CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 109 (1962) (citing Cruikshank for the view that
the language in the First Amendment “constituted the right of petition as the primary right,
and the right of assembly as the ancillary right, thereby guaranteeing a right to assemble in
order to petition”); M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 152
(2d ed. 1981) (“It is important to note that the Cruikshank dictum narrowed the federal right
from that of ‘the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances’ to ‘the
right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
National Government.’” (emphasis added)); EDWARD S. CORWIN, HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG
R. DUCAT, EDWIN S. CORWIN’S THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 332 (14th ed.
1978) (1920) (citing Cruikshank for the view that “historically, the right of petition is the
primary right, the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if
Amendment I read: ‘the right of the people peaceably to assemble’ in order to ‘petition the
government’”). Presser has also been cited for the view that the freedom of assembly is
limited to the purpose of petition. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of
Association, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (1987) (citing Presser for the view that the
freedom of assembly is “the exercise by groups of the right to petition for redress of
grievances”).
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storied and complex, and even the most elementary treatment of them
is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet we can nevertheless glean
insights into the importance of assembly through snapshots of each.

A. Suffragists
The new women’s movement began at the end of the nineteenth
century, when “[h]undreds of thousands of women joined the
thousands of clubs united under the auspices of the General Federation
of Women’s Clubs and the National Association of Colored Women.”126
According to Linda Lumsden, these clubs “served as training grounds
for the activist, articulate reformers who steered the suffrage
movement in the 1910s.”127 In 1908, various women’s clubs began
holding “open-air” campaigns to draw attention to their interests:
The success of the open-air campaigns helped prompt the organization
of the first American suffrage parades, a more visible and assertive
form of assembly. The spectacle of women marching shoulder to
shoulder achieved many ends. One was that because of the press
coverage parades attracted, suffrage became a nationwide issue.
Women also acquired organizational and executive skills in the course
of orchestrating extravaganzas featuring tens of thousands of marchers,
floats, and bands. Better yet, parades showcased women’s skills in
those areas and emphasized their numbers and determination. Finally,
and most crucially, marching together imbued women with a sense of
solidarity that lifted the movement to the status of a crusade for many
128
participants.

As is often the case, the growth of local assemblies corresponded
to the growth of the larger institutional structures that operated on a
national level.129 The National American Woman Suffrage Association
grew from 45,000 in 1907, to 100,000 in 1915, to almost two million
in 1917.130 But the core of assembly in the women’s movement came
through networking and personal connections at the local level.
Women’s assemblies were not confined to traditional deliberative
meetings but included banner meetings, balls, swimming races, potato
sack races, baby shows, sharing of meals, pageants, and teatimes.131
126.
127.
128.
129.

LUMSDEN, supra note 93, at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 146.
See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO

MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (2003) (discussing the relationship between
grassroots movements and larger institutional structures).
130. LUMSDEN, supra note 93, at 3.
131. Id. at 17-19.
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Just as the Democratic-Republican Societies had earlier refused to
limit their gatherings to formal meetings, the women’s movement
capitalized on an expanded conception of public political life built
upon an array of physical gatherings. These gatherings appealed not
only to reason but also to the emotions of those before whom they
assembled. As Harriot Stanton Blatch affirmed in 1912, men and
women “are moved by seeing marching groups of people and by
hearing music far more than by listening to the most careful
argument.”132

B.

Civil Rights Activism

A second manifestation of the right of assembly during the
Progressive Era involved political organizing among African
Americans. These efforts repeatedly met with mob violence by white
citizens largely unrestrained by state and federal authorities. The first
decade of the twentieth century saw “savage race riots” around the
country, including significant violence in Atlanta in 1906 and
Springfield, Illinois, in 1908.133 Stirred by observing first-hand the
carnage resulting from these riots, Mary White Ovington joined Jane
Addams, William Lloyd Garrison, John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois and
other prominent Americans in calling for a conference to discuss
“present evils, the voicing of protests, and the renewal of the struggle
for civil and political liberty.”134 The first National Negro Conference
that ensued led to the formation of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).135
Based partly on the proximity between labor unrest and racial
violence, government officials linked the increasing political activity
among African Americans to the influence of communism, a
connection that foreshadowed even greater problems for civil liberties
a generation later. Theodore Kornweibel reports that J. Edgar Hoover
“fixated on the belief that racial militants were seeking to break down
social barriers separating blacks from whites, and that they were

132. Quoted in Jennifer L. Borda, The Woman Suffrage Parades of 1910-1913:
Possibilities and Limitations of an Early Feminist Rhetorical Strategy, 66 W. J. COMM. 25
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. John P. Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 119
(1963).
134. LANGSTON HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE NAACP 22 (1962)
(quoting Oswald Garrison Villard’s “Call for a Conference”).
135. GILBERT JONAS, FREEDOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
RACISM IN AMERICA, 1909-1969, at 13-15 (2005).
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inspired by communists or were the pawns of communists.”136 In a
report to Congress, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer described “‘a
well-concerted movement among a certain class of Negro leaders of
thought and action to constitute themselves a determined and
persistent source of radical opposition to the Government’ . . . who
proclaimed ‘an outspoken advocacy of the Bolsheviki or Soviet
doctrines.’”137
Armed with these suspicions of communist influences, agents
from the Bureau of Investigation carefully monitored and constrained
the efforts of African Americans to organize through blatant violations
of the right of assembly. When A. Philip Randolph and Chandler
Owen, the editors of the black publication The Messenger, arrived to
address a large crowd in Cleveland on August 4, 1918, two Bureau
agents confiscated their publications and took them into custody for
interrogation.138 Undercover informants and the first black agents of
the Bureau infiltrated local gatherings of the NAACP and other
African-American organizations.139 An agent attending a Du Bois
lecture in Toledo reported that the audience consisted of “mostly
radicals.”140 In Boston, an agent reported that Du Bois’ editorials were
urging that supporters “incite riots and cause bloodshed.”141 The
Bureau also kept tabs on whites associated with the NAACP, including
Jane Addams and Anita Whitney.142

C.

Organized Labor

The most frequent articulations of the right of assembly during
the Progressive Era came from an increasingly vocal labor movement.
Widespread labor unrest had emerged at the end of the nineteenth
century with the increase in industrialization and immigration.143 The
“Great Strike” of 1877 had involved over 100,000 workers throughout
the country and brought to a halt most of the nation’s transportation
system.144 By the early 1880s, the Knights of Labor had organized
136. THEODORE KORNWEIBEL, JR., “SEEING RED”: FEDERAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST
BLACK MILITANCY, 1919-1925 xii (1998).
137. Id. at xv.
138. Id. at 77.
139. Id. at 62, 102.
140. Id. at 64-66.
141. Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Kornweibel, this was
an “outrageously exaggerated charge.” Id.
142. Id.
143. Alexis J. Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 18701915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 58 (1980).
144. PHILIP S. FONER, THE GREAT LABOR UPRISING OF 1877, at 8, 10, 27 (1977).
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hundreds of thousands of workers.145 The Haymarket Riot of 1886 and
the Pullman Strike of 1894 sandwiched “almost a decade of labor
unrest punctuated by episodes of spectacular violence” which included
“the strike of the Homestead Steel workers against the Carnegie
Corporation, the miners’ strikes in the coal mining regions of the East
and hardrock states in the West, a longshoremen’s strike in New
Orleans that united black and white workers, and numerous railroad
strikes.”146 But these labor efforts remained largely unorganized, and
direct appeals to the freedom of assembly by the labor movement did
not begin in earnest until the formation of the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW) in 1905.
The IWW (nicknamed the “Wobblies”) formed out of a
conglomeration of labor interests dissatisfied with the reform efforts of
the American Federation of Labor. Led by William Haywood, Daniel
De Leon, and Eugene Debs, the Wobblies employed provocative words
and actions. The preamble to their Constitution declared that “the
working class and the employing class have nothing in common,” and
the IWW advocated this message in gatherings and demonstrations
throughout the country.147
The freedom of assembly figured prominently in the IWW’s
appeals to constitutional protections during organized strikes in major
industries including steel, textiles, rubber, and automobiles from 1909
to 1913. In 1910, Wobblies highlighted the denial of the right to
assemble at a demonstration in Spokane, Washington.148 When
members of the IWW invoked the rights of speech and assembly
during the Paterson Silk Strike of 1913, Paterson Mayor H.G. McBride
responded that these protections extended to the striking silk workers
but not to the Wobblies:
I cannot stand for seeing Paterson flooded with persons who have no
interest in Paterson, who can only give us a bad name, who can despoil
145. Louis Adamic reported that by May of 1886, the Knights of Labor had surpassed
one million members. LOUIS ADAMIC, DYNAMITE: THE STORY OF CLASS VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 86 (1931). Despite these numbers, the Knights of Labor were “anything but
effectual” throughout their history. Id. at 58-59, 87.
146. Richard Schneirov, Shelton Stromquist & Nick Salvatore, Introduction to THE
PULLMAN STRIKE AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1890S, at 4 (Shelton Stromquist & Nick Salvatore
eds., 1999).
147. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 383 (1927) (quoting INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE
WORLD CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.iww.org/culture/official/preamble.shtml)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
148. David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions of
Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1076 (1994) (citing A Call to
Action, INDUSTRIAL WORKER (Seattle), Feb. 26, 1910, at 2).

2010]

FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

595

in a few hours a good name we have been years in building up, and I
propose to continue my policy of locking these outside agitators up on
149
sight.

True to his word, Mayor McBride arrested a number of IWW leaders,
including Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.150 Later that year, the IWW
publication Solidarity protested that “America today has abandoned
her heroic traditions of the Revolution and the War of 1812 and has
turned to hoodlumism and a denial of free speech and assembly to a
large and growing body of citizens.”151
VII. THE INTER-WAR YEARS AND THE RISE OF THE FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY
The growing fear of communism facilitated gross incursions on
the freedom of assembly across progressive movements. As Irwin
Marcus has observed: “Unrest associated with the assertiveness of
women, African Americans, and immigrant workers could be ascribed
to the influence of the Communists and inoculating Americans with a
vaccine of 100 percent Americanism was offered as a cure for national
problems.”152 The rising Americanism was on the verge of claiming the
freedom of assembly as one of its casualties. On the eve of America’s
entry into the First World War, President Wilson predicted to New York
World editor Frank Cobb that “the Constitution would not survive” the
war and “free speech and the right of assembly would go.”153 Seven
months later, Wilson’s words seemed ominously prescient when the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia triggered the First Red Scare. Over
the next few years, the freedom of assembly was constrained by
shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918
amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice
Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920, which “effectively
torpedoed most notions of freedom of expression and freedom of
149. Paterson Checks Weavers’ Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1927, at 22.
150. Id.
151. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 84-85 (1997) (quoting
Heroic Contrasts, SOLIDARITY, July 26, 1913, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152. Irwin M. Marcus, The Johnstown Steel Strike of 1919: The Struggle for
Unionism and Civil Liberties, 63 PENN. HIST. 96, 100 (1996). A variant of these views
resurfaced during the “liberal consensus” of mid-twentieth century pluralism, just as the
Court first recognized a constitutional right of association. See Inazu, supra note 18.
153. JOHN L. HEATON, COBB OF “THE WORLD:” A LEADER IN LIBERALISM 269-70
(1924) (internal quotation marks omitted). There has been some debate as to when or even
whether the conversation occurred. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Woodrow Wilson’s “Prediction”
to Frank Cobb: Words Historians Should Doubt Ever Got Spoken, 54 J. AM. HIST. 608
(1967); Arthur S. Link, That Cobb Interview, 72 J. AM. HIST. 7 (1985).
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association that survived the war fought to make the world safe for
democracy.”154

A. A New Conception of the First Amendment
Despite the Red Scare, and probably because of some of the
flagrant abuses of civil liberties that occurred during it, libertarian
interpretations of the First Amendment that had surfaced prior to the
First World War began to take shape shortly into the inter-war period.155
Meanwhile, Samuel Gompers repeatedly invoked the freedoms of
speech and assembly in his battle against labor injunctions.156
The growing importance of assembly in political and legal
discourse during the 1920s is strikingly evident in Justice Brandeis’s
famous opinion in Whitney v. California.157 Anita Whitney’s appeal
stemmed from her conviction under California’s Criminal Syndicalism
Act for having served as a delegate to the 1919 organizing convention
154. AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 57 (1995).
155. Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., led the doctrinal synthesis with his
1919 article “Freedom of Speech in War Time” and his book Freedom of Speech the
following year. RABBAN, supra note 151, at 4-5 (citing Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech
in War Time, DUNSTER HOUSE PAPERS, July 1917, at 1; ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1920)); see also John Wertheimer, Freedom of Speech: Zechariah Chafee and FreeSpeech History, 22 REVS. AM. HIST. 365, 374 (1994). Although Chafee’s scholarship was
shaky, it “provided intellectual cover for Justices Holmes and Brandeis when they began to
dissent in First Amendment cases in the fall of 1919.” RABBAN, supra note 151, at 7. On the
problems with Chafee’s scholarship, see Wertheimer, supra at 374-75 (noting that Chafee’s
“record as a scholar rightly gives us pause”). Wertheimer also notes that Chafee’s advocacy
was not without personal risk: “A group of conservative Harvard Law School alumni, with
behind-the-scenes help from J. Edgar Hoover and the Justice Department, launched a
campaign to have Chafee fired from Harvard on the grounds that his free-speech writings
rendered him unfit to continue teaching there.” Id. at 368.
156. Gompers Fights Sedition Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1920, at 15 (Sterling-Graham
sedition bill “can be used to kill free speech and free assembly”); Labor Will Fight for Every
Right, Gompers Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1922, at 1 (arguing against the denial of
“freedom of expression, freedom of press, and the freedom of assembly”); Gompers Assails
Harding on Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1923, at 3 (“[T]he Daugherty injunction . . . sought to
deny the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the
press to railroad workers.”). In 1951, President Truman, speaking at the dedication of a
memorial to Gompers, said, “[A]bove all, he fought the labor injunction because it was used
to violate the constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of assembly.” President Harry
S. Truman, Addresss at the Dedication of a Square in Washington to the Memory of Samuel
Gompers (Oct. 27, 1951) (transcript available at the American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu).
157. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The decision was formally
overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandeis concurred
rather than dissented in Whitney on procedural grounds, but his opinion strongly rebuked of
the majority’s reasoning. See PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
306 (1984).
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of the Communist Labor Party of California.158 The Court rejected her
argument that the California law violated her rights under the First
Amendment, expressing particular concern that her actions had been
undertaken in concert with others, which “involve[d] even greater
danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and
acts of individuals.”159
Chafing at this rationale, Brandeis penned some of the most wellknown words in American jurisprudence:
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
160
fundamental principle of the American government.

The freedoms of “speech and assembly” lie at the heart of Brandeis’s
argument—the phrase appears eleven times in his brief concurrence.
The two freedoms had been linked only once before; after Whitney,
the nexus occurs in over one hundred of the Court’s opinions.161 The
connection between assembly and speech highlights that a group
expresses itself not only through spoken words but also through its
very act of gathering. As the Court itself recognized, group expression
was far more worrisome than “the isolated utterances and acts of
individuals.”162

158. Vincent Blasi has written a fascinating account of these circumstances. See
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
159. 274 U.S. at 372.
160. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Legal scholars have written volumes about
these words and those that followed, and Brandeis’s concurrence has been praised for its
eloquent defense of free speech. Vincent Blasi has called the opinion “arguably the most
important essay ever written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”
Blasi, supra note 158, at 668. And Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the landmark
case New York Times v. Sullivan, deemed Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence the “classic
formulation” of the fundamental principle underlying free speech. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
cf. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY
AND POLITICS 194 (2002); Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First Amendment:
1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 349, 371 (1981) (asserting that Brandeis’s concurrence is a
“classic statement of free speech”).
161. E.g., New York ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U.S. 590, 591 (1923) (noting that
petitioners alleged a deprivation of the “rights of freedom of speech and assembly”).
162. 274 U.S. at 372.
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New Challenges to Labor

In the early 1920s, the conservative wing of the Supreme Court
issued a series of antilabor decisions aimed at stopping picketing and
union organizing.163 But by 1933, workers had successfully obtained
legislative relief through the National Industrial Recovery Act, which
provided the first guarantee to workers of the right to organize in
associations. Two years later, the Wagner Act sought to strengthen the
associational rights of workers even further.
The relationship between the right of assembly and the interests
of labor took on a more public dimension on April 10, 1936, when
Congress held hearings on legislation to authorize the Committee on
Education and Labor to investigate “violations of the rights of free
speech and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to
organize and bargain collectively.”164 National Labor Relations Board
chairman J. Warren Madden testified that “[t]he right of workmen to
organize themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty”
and that workers could not organize without exercising the rights of
free speech and assembly.165 Following the hearings and subsequent
approval of the Senate measure, Committee Chair Hugo Black named
Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. of Wisconsin to chair a subcommittee to
investigate these concerns. The La Follette Committee embarked with
“the zeal of missionaries” in an exhaustive investigation that spanned
five years.166 When it concluded, La Follette reported to Congress that
“[t]he most spectacular violations of civil liberty . . . [have] their roots
in economic conflicts of interest” and emphasized that “[a]ssociation
and self-organization are simply the result of the exercise of the
fundamental rights of free speech and assembly.”167
Rhetoric across the political spectrum during the mid-1930s
echoed the importance of assembly in the labor context. In a 1935
speech on Constitution Day, former President Hebert Hoover listed
assembly among the core freedoms that guarded liberty.168 That same
year, President Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary Harold Ickes referred to
the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as “the three musketeers
163. Cover, supra note 160, at 354.
164. Jerold S. Auerbach, The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the
New Deal, 51 J. AM. HIST. 435, 440 (1964) (citing 74 CONG. REC. 4151 (1936) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
165. Id. at 440 n.30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 442.
167. Id. at 442 n.40 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 3311 (1942)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
168. Hoover’s Warning of the Perils to Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1935, at 10.
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of our constitutional forces” during an address before an annual
luncheon of the Associated Press.169 Ickes asserted: “We might give
up all the rest of our Constitution, if occasion required it . . . [a]nd yet
have sure anchorage for the mooring of our good ship America, if
these rights remained to us unimpaired.”170

C.

Assembly Made Applicable to the States

In 1937, the Supreme Court made the freedom of assembly
applicable to state as well as federal action in De Jonge v. Oregon.171
Chief Justice Hughes asserted that the right of assembly “cannot be
denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,—
principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general
terms of its due process clause.”172 In words strikingly similar to
Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence, he emphasized:
[The need] to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech,
free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained
by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very
173
foundation of constitutional government.

Hughes underscored the significance of applying the right of assembly
to state action by observing that “[t]he right of peaceable assembly is a
right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.”174

D.

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization

At the end of 1938, the American Bar Association’s Committee
on the Bill of Rights advocated the importance of the right of assembly
in an amicus brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.175 The
appeal addressed Mayor Frank Hague’s repeated denials of a permit to
169. Long and Coughlin Classed by Ickes as ‘Contemptible,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1935, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
172. Id. at 364.
173. Id. at 365.
174. Id. at 364. Brandeis had called the right of assembly fundamental in his Whitney
concurrence ten years earlier. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
175. Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939).
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the Committee for Industrial Organization to hold a public meeting in
Jersey City. The ABA’s lengthy brief emphasized that “the integrity of
the right ‘peaceably to assemble’ is an essential element of the
American democratic system” involving “the citizen’s right to meet
face to face with others for the discussion of their ideas and
problems—religious, political, economic or social”; that “assemblies
face to face perform a function of vital significance in the American
system”; and that public officials had the “duty to make the right of
free assembly prevail over the forces of disorder if by any reasonable
effort or means they can possibly do so.”176
The amicus brief garnered an unusual amount of attention. The
American Bar Association wrote:
The filing of the brief was widely hailed as a great step in the defense
of liberty and the American traditions of free speech and free assembly
as basic institutions of democratic government. The clear and earnest
argument of the brief was attested as an admirable exposition of the
fundamental American faith. Hardly any action in the name of the
American Bar Association in many years, if ever, has attracted as wide
and immediate attention and as general acclaim, as the preparation and
177
filing of this brief.

The New York Times reviewed the brief with similarly effusive
language:
This brief ought to stand as a landmark in American legal history. It
ought to be multiplied and spread about in all communities in which
private citizens, private organizations or public officials dare threaten or
suppress the basic guarantees of American liberty. It ought to be on file
in every police station. It ought to be in every public library, in every
178
school library, and certainly in the home of every voter in Jersey City.

176. Brief for the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae, Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651) [hereinafter
Brief for the Committee].
177. Association’s Committee Intervenes To Defend Right of Public Assembly, 25
A.B.A. J. 7 (1939).
178. Editorial, A Brief for Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 18. The Times
later wrote that the brief “was received all over the country with approval as a lucid
exposition and defense of the fundamental guarantee of American liberty.” Editorial, Bar and
Civil Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1939, at 10. Zechariah Chafee had a substantial role in
drafting the brief. When he published Free Speech in the United States two years later, his
thirty-page discussion of the freedom of assembly consisted almost entirely of verbatim
sections of the brief. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 40938 (1941).
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The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the C.I.O., but Hague appealed to
the Supreme Court, setting the stage for an even broader judicial
endorsement of the freedom of assembly.179

E.

The Four Freedoms

In 1939, assembly joined religion, speech, and press as one of the
“Four Freedoms” celebrated in the New York World’s Fair. Fair
organizers commissioned Leo Friedlander to design a group of statues
commemorating each of the four freedoms.180 Grover Whalen, the
president of the fair corporation, credited New York Times president
and publisher Arthur Sulzberger with the idea:
Mr. Sulzberger pointed out that if we portrayed four of the
constitutional guarantees of liberty in the “freedom group” we could
teach the millions of visitors to the fair a lesson in history with a moral.
The lesson is that freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of
assembly and freedom of speech, firmly fixed in the cornerstone of our
government since the days of Washington, have enabled us to build the
most successful democracy in the world. And the moral is that as long
as these freedoms remain a part of our constitutional set-up we can face
the problems of tomorrow, a nation of people calm, united and
181
unafraid.

The buildup to the opening of the Fair began with New Year’s Day
speeches celebrating each of the four freedoms that were broadcast
internationally from Radio City Music Hall. Dorothy Thompson, the
“First Lady of American Journalism,” delivered the speech on the
freedom of assembly.182 Calling assembly “the most essential right of
the four,” Thompson elaborated:
The right to meet together for one purpose or another is actually the
guaranty of the three other rights. Because what good is free speech if
it impossible to assemble people to listen to it? How are you going to
have discussion at all unless you can hire a hall? How are you going to
179. The Committee on the Bill of Rights had submitted a revised version of its
amicus brief when the case had reached the Supreme Court. Brief for the Committee, supra
note 176.
180. Mile-Long Mall Feature of Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1937, at 57.
181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Fair To Broadcast to World Today, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1939, at 13. Thompson
was at the time a news commentator for the New York Herald Tribune. She was considered
by some to be “the most influential woman in the United States after Eleanor Roosevelt,” and
her syndicated column, “On the Record,” reached an estimated eight to ten million readers
three times a week. SUSAN WARE, LETTER TO THE WORLD: SEVEN WOMEN WHO SHAPED THE
AMERICAN CENTURY 45 (1998). Thompson’s portrait made the cover of Time on June 13,
1939. Id. at 47.
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practice your religion, unless you can meet with a community of people
who feel the same way? How can you even get out a newspaper, or any
183
publication, without assembling some people to do it?

Three months later, Columbia University president Nicholas Butler
penned a New York Times editorial on “The Four Freedoms.”184 With
the European conflict in mind, Butler warned of the “millions upon
millions of human beings living under governments which not only do
not accept the Four Freedoms, but frankly and openly deny them all.”185
The following month, the Times ran an editorial by Henry Steele
Commager. Commager decried the assaults on the “four fundamental
freedoms” and concluded his essay by asserting: “The careful
safeguards which our forefathers set up around freedom of religion,
speech, press and assembly prove that these freedoms were thought to
be basic to the effective functioning of democratic and republican
government. The truth of that conviction was never more apparent
than it is now.”186
On April 30, 1939, the opening day of the World’s Fair, New York
Mayor Fiorello la Guardia called the site of Friedlander’s four statues
the “heart of the fair.”187 Before an audience of fifteen to twenty
thousand, la Guardia proclaimed that the right of assembly “must be
given to any group who desire to meet and there discuss any problem
that they desire.”188
Barely a month after the opening of the World’s Fair, the Supreme
Court issued its Hague decision, noting that streets and parks were
publicly available “for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”189 The New York
Times’ coverage of Hague pronounced: “With Right of Assembly
Reasserted, All ‘Four Freedoms’ of Constitution Are Well
Established.”190
Hague’s words on the heels of the tribute to the four freedoms at
the World’s Fair seemed to anchor the freedom of assembly in political
183. Dorothy Thompson, Democracy 1 (Jan. 1, 1939) (transcript available in the
Syracuse University Library, Dorothy Thompson Papers, ser. VII, box 6). Thompson’s speech
pitted the free assembly of democracy against the abuses of fascism.
184. Nicholas Murray Butler, The Four Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1939, at AS5.
185. Id. Pictures of Friedlander’s statues accompanied the editorial.
186. Henry Steele Commager, “To Secure the Blessings of Liberty,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1939, at SM3.
187. Mayor Dedicates Plaza of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1939, at 4.
188. Id.
189. 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
190. Dean Dinwoodey, A Fundamental Liberty Upheld in Hague Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 1939, at E7.
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discourse. Indeed, a poll by Elmo Roper’s organization at the end of
1940 reported that 89.9% of respondents thought their personal
liberties would be decreased by restrictions on freedom of assembly
(compared to 81.5% who expressed concern over restrictions on
“freedom of speech by press and radio”).191 Americans appeared
resolute in their belief of the indispensability of free assembly to
democracy, and the importance of assembly seemed secure.
Politics and history decided otherwise. On January 6, 1941,
President Roosevelt proclaimed “four essential human freedoms” in
his State of the Union Address.192 Rather than refer to the freedoms of
speech, religion, assembly and press that had formed the centerpiece
of the World’s Fair, Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech” called upon
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from
want, and freedom from fear. The new formulation—absent assembly—
quickly overtook the old. Seven months later, Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill incorporated the new four freedoms into the Atlantic
Charter. In 1943, Norman Rockwell created four paintings inspired by
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms. The Saturday Evening Post printed the
paintings in successive editions, accompanied by matching essays
expounding upon each of the freedoms. And like the earlier four
freedoms, the new ones were also set in stone. Roosevelt
commissioned Walter Russell to create the Four Freedoms Monument,
which was dedicated at Madison Square Garden. Today, the Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute honors well-known individuals with
the “Four Freedoms Award.”193
VIII. THE RHETORIC OF ASSEMBLY
Despite its absence from Roosevelt’s formulation of the Four
Freedoms, the freedom of assembly did not disappear from political
and legal discourse overnight. In 1941, an illustrious group called
“The Free Company” penned a series of radio dramas about the First
Amendment. Attorney General Robert Jackson and Solicitor General
Francis Biddle helped shape the group, which included Robert
Sherwood (then Roosevelt’s speechwriter), William Saroyan, Maxwell
Anderson, Ernest Hemingway, and James Boyd.194 The group operated
191. Editorial, Public Mind in Good Health, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1941, at 4.
192. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, The “Four
Freedoms” Speech (Jan. 6, 1941).
193. See The Franklin D. Roosevelt Four Freedoms Awards Home Page, http://
www.FourFreedoms.nl (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
194. Radio Broadcast: Of Thee They Sing, TIME, Feb. 24, 1941.
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under what was “virtually a Government charter” to spread a message
of democracy.195
Orson Welles wrote The Free Company’s play on the freedom of
assembly. “His Honor, the Mayor” portrayed the dilemma of Bill
Knaggs, a fictional mayor confronted with an impending rally of a
group called the “White Crusaders.” After deciding to allow the rally,
the mayor addressed the crowd that had gathered in protest:
[D]on’t start forbiddin’ anybody the right to assemble. Democracy’s a
rare precious thing and once you start that—you’ve finished
democracy! Democracy guarantees freedom of assembly unconditionally to the worst lice that want it. . . . All of you’ve read the history
books. You know what the right to assemble and worship God meant to
most of those folks that first came here, the ones that couldn’t pray the
196
way they wanted to in the old country?

The play concluded with music followed by the voice of the narrator:
Like his honor, the Mayor, then, let us stand fast by the right of lawful
assembly. Let us say with that great fighter for freedom, Voltaire, “I
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to
say it.” Thus one of our ancient, hard-won liberties will be made secure
and we, differing though we may at times among ourselves, will stand
together on a principle to make sure that government of the people, by
197
the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.

Not everyone shared these sentiments. Following the broadcast of
“His Honor, The Mayor,” the Hearst newspaper chain and the
American Legion attacked it as “un-American and tending to
encourage communism and other subversive groups” and “cleverly
designed to poison the minds of young Americans.”198 The next week,
J. Edgar Hoover drafted a Justice Department memorandum
“concerning the alleged Communist activities and connections of
Orson Welles.”199
Later in 1941, festivities around the country marked the
sesquicentennial anniversary of the Bill of Rights. In Washington
D.C.’s Post Square, organizers of a celebration displayed an enormous
195. Radio Broadcast: Freely Criticized Company, TIME, Apr. 28, 1941.
196. Orson Welles, His Honor, The Mayor, in THE FREE COMPANY PRESENTS: A
COLLECTION OF PLAYS ABOUT THE MEANING OF AMERICA 143 (1941).
197. Id.
198. CHARLES HIGHAM, ORSON WELLES: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN GENIUS
175 (1985); Freely Criticized Company, supra note 195.
199. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to
Matthew F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney Gen. (Apr. 24, 1941), available at http://www.
wellesnet.com/?p=186.
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copy of the Bill of Rights next to the four phrases: “Freedom of
Speech, Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of the
Press.”200 The Sesquicentennial Committee, with President Roosevelt
as its chair, issued a proclamation describing the original four
freedoms as “the pillars which sustain the temple of liberty under
law.”201 Days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt declared
that December 15, 1941, would be “Bill of Rights Day.” Roosevelt
heralded the “immeasurable privileges” of the First Amendment and
signed the proclamation for Bill of Rights Day against the backdrop of
a mural listing the original four freedoms.202 The photo op was not
without irony; less than three months later he signed Executive Order
9066, authorizing the internment of Japanese Americans.
Although the Supreme Court endorsed the President’s restrictions
on the civil liberties of Japanese Americans in Hirabayashi v. United
States203 and Korematsu v. United States,204 it elsewhere affirmed a core
commitment to the Bill of Rights generally and the freedom of
assembly in particular. In 1943, Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia
v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
205
outcome of no elections.

Two years later, the Court emphasized in Thomas v. Collins that
restrictions of assembly could only be justified under the “clear and
present danger” standard that the Court had adopted in its free speech
cases.206 By a 5-4 majority, the Court overturned the contempt
conviction of a labor spokesman who had given a speech in Houston
despite a restraining order prohibiting him from doing so. Because of
the “preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment,” the Court
200. Scott Hart, America Celebrates 150th Anniversary of Bill of Rights, WASH. POST,
Dec. 15, 1941, at 19.
201. Henry Steele Commager, Charter of Our Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1941,
at SM6.
202. Day Will Honor Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1941, at 19.
203. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
204. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
205. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
206. 323 U.S. 516, 527 (1945).
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concluded that only “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”207
Justice
Rutledge’s opinion noted that the right of assembly guarded “not solely
religious or political” causes but also “secular causes,” great and
small.208 And Rutledge recognized the expressive nature of assembly
by noting that the rights of the speaker and the audience were
“necessarily correlative.”209 As Aviam Soifer has suggested, Rutledge’s
“dynamic, relational language” emphasized that the right of assembly
was “broad enough to include private as well as public gatherings,
economic as well as political subjects, and passionate opinions as well
as factual statements.”210
A further endorsement of assembly came by way of the executive
branch in the 1947 Report of the President’s Committee on Civil
Rights.211 The Report indicated that the “great freedoms” of religion,
speech, press, and assembly were “relatively secure” and that citizens
were “normally free . . . to assemble for unlimited public
discussions.”212 Noting growing concerns about “Communists and
Fascists,” the Committee asserted that it “unqualifiedly opposes any
attempt to impose special limitations on the rights of these people to
speak and assemble” and cautioned that while “the government has the
obligation to have in its employ only citizens of unquestioned loyalty,”
our “whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning
against the possible misuse of loyalty checks to inhibit freedom of
opinion and expression.”213
IX. THE RISE OF ASSOCIATION AND THE END OF ASSEMBLY
With an irony that rivaled President Roosevelt’s Bill of Rights
Day proclamation, President Truman established the Federal Employee
Loyalty Program the same year that his committee issued its civil
207. Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
208. Id. The “preferred place” language originated in Justice Douglas’s opinion for the
Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”).
209. 323 U.S. at 534.
210. SOIFER, supra note 154, at 77-78. Soifer argues that the principles articulated in
Thomas “starkly contrast with the instrumental focus of more recent freedom of association
decisions.” Id. at 78.
211. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947). President Truman
established the Committee with Executive Order 9808. Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg.
14,153 (Dec. 5, 1946).
212. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 211, at 47.
213. Id. at 48, 50 (emphasis omitted).
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rights report. The loyalty program empowered the federal government
to deny employment to “disloyal” individuals.214 The government’s
loyalty determination could consider “activities and associations” that
included “[m]embership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association
with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,
group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General
as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive.”215 Attorney General
Tom Clark quickly generated a list of 123 “subversive” organizations.216 Within a year, the FBI had examined over two million federal
employees and conducted over 6300 full investigations.217
The restrictions imposed by the loyalty program prompted some
of the earliest articulations of a previously unseen defense of group
autonomy: a constitutional right of association.218 Constitutional
scholar Thomas Emerson attacked the loyalty program in a 1947
article in the Yale Law Journal, contending that the investigations
infringed upon the “concept of the right to freedom [of] political
expression” emerged from “the specific guarantees of freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, the right of assembly and the right to
petition the government.”219 This right of political expression was
“basic, in the deepest sense, for it underlies the whole theory of
democracy.”220 Emerson cited a recent speech by Charles Wyzanski,
Jr., who had argued that the “peculiarly complicated” freedom of
association “cuts underneath the visible law to the core of our political
science and our philosophy.”221
These nascent references to a right of association emerged just as
the Supreme Court entered the fray of the Communist Scare with its
1950 decision, American Communications Ass’n v. Douds.222 Douds
involved a challenge to the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which required that union officers
submit affidavits disavowing membership in or support of the
214. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU
176 (1990) (quoting Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1947).
215. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra note 214.
216. Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government
Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1948).
217. Id.
218. What follows in this Part is a much abbreviated version of my account of the
emergence of the right of association in Inazu, supra note 18.
219. Id. at 83.
220. Id.
221. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry into
Freedom of Association, 35 CAL. L. REV. 336, 337-38 (1947).
222. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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Communist Party before a union could receive the NLRA’s
protections.223 Although recognizing “[t]he high place in which the
right to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the Framers
of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both
as a means and an end,” Chief Justice Vinson concluded that the Act
reflected “legitimate attempts to protect the public, not from the
remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but from present
excesses of direct, active conduct.”224 The denial of associational
protections continued in Dennis v. United States225 and Adler v. Board
of Education226 before the Court finally imposed some limits on
anticommunist legislation in Wieman v. Updegraff.227
Despite hints of greater associational protections in Wieman—
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence described “a right of association
peculiarly characteristic of our people”228—the communist cases
proved inadequate for elaborating upon the right of association toward
which Emerson and others had gestured. Instead, the first explicit
recognition of a constitutional right of association came in the civil
rights context, with the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson.229 By this time, the distinction between
assembly and association was sufficiently muddled. Justice Harlan’s
opinion for a unanimous Court framed the constitutional question in
terms of the “fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”230 He began his constitutional
analysis by citing De Jonge v. Oregon231 and Thomas v. Collins232 for
the following principle: “Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced
by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.”233 De Jonge and Thomas had established that the freedom
223. Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 159(h) (1947) (amending National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1935)).
224. 339 U.S. at 399.
225. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
226. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
227. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
228. Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
229. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). I explore the doctrinal tensions of the right of association
that resulted from the Court’s differing treatment of communist and civil rights cases in Inazu,
supra note 18.
230. 357 U.S. at 460.
231. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
232. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
233. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
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of assembly applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment;
that it covered political, economic, religious, and secular matters; and
that it could only be restricted “to prevent grave and immediate danger
to interests which the State may lawfully protect.”234 Based on these
precedents, Justice Harlan could have grounded his decision in the
freedom of assembly. But he instead shifted away from assembly,
writing in the next sentence, “it is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”235
The Alabama courts had constrained the “right to freedom of
association” of members of the NAACP.236 These members had a
“constitutionally protected right of association” that meant they could
“pursue their lawful private interests privately” and “associate freely
with others in so doing.”237 Writing a few years after NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Emerson suggested that Justice Harlan
“initially treated freedom of association as derivative from the first
amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and as ancillary
to them” and then “elevated freedom of association to an independent
right, possessing an equal status with the other rights specifically
enumerated in the first amendment.”238
Despite its adventitious roots, the new right of association gained
traction in a series of civil rights cases challenging state attacks on the
NAACP.239 By the mid-1960s, the only cases addressing the freedom
of assembly (as distinct from the freedom of association) were those
overturning convictions of African Americans who had participated in
234. De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364; Thomas, 323 U.S. at 528 n.12 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
235. 357 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). He then proceeded to discuss the “protected
liberties” of speech and press that were “assured under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at
461.
236. Id. at 462.
237. Id. at 463, 466.
238. Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1964). Justice Harlan’s opinion is more ambiguous than Emerson suggests: it
is not clear that he relied at all on the First Amendment to ground association—the opinion,
in fact, never mentions the First Amendment.
239. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Gibson v. Fla.
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). During this same era, the Court either
ignored or downplayed similar freedom of association cases involving suspected communists.
See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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peaceful civil rights demonstrations.240 In political discourse, Martin
Luther King, Jr., appealed to assembly in his Letter from a
Birmingham Jail and in his speech, I’ve Been to the Mountaintop,
delivered just prior to his assassination.241 But by the end of the 1960s,
the right of assembly in law and politics was limited almost entirely to
public gatherings like protests and demonstrations. Earlier intimations
of a broadly construed right beyond these narrow circumstances were
largely forgotten.
In 1983, the Court swept the remnants of freedom of assembly
within the ambit of free speech law in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n.242 Justice White reasoned:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the
spectrum are streets and parks which have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. In these quintessential public forums, the
government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State
to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations of
the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
243
open ample alternative channels of communication.

The doctrinal language came straight out of the Court’s free speech
cases and made no mention of the right of assembly.244 With Perry,
240. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); cf.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (“The First [Amendment does] not
permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its
exercise may be ‘annoying’ to some people.”).
241. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM THE BIRMINGHAM JAIL 14 (Harper
Collins 1944) (1963) (asserting that the Birmingham ordinance denied “citizens the First
Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and peaceful protest”); MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., I’VE BEEN TO THE MOUNTAINTOP 12-13 (Harper Collins 1994) (1968) (“But somewhere I
read of the freedom of assembly.”).
242. 460 U.S. 37 (1983); cf. BAKER, supra note 9, at 316 n.18 (“An interesting, and
[perhaps] ideologically telling, practice of the Supreme Court is its focus on ‘speech’ and
expression in cases in which it has the option of using either a speech or an assembly
analysis.”).
243. 460 U.S. at 45 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
244. Perry cited Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980), U.S. Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
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even cases involving protests or demonstrations could now be resolved
without reference to assembly. The Court’s 1988 opinion in Boos v.
Barry exemplifies this change.245 Boos involved a challenge to a
District of Columbia law that prohibited, among other things,
congregating “within 500 feet of any building or premises within the
District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government or
its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate,
or for other official purposes.”246 On its face, the challenge to the
regulation appeared to rest on the right of assembly. The petitioner
challenged the deprivation of First Amendment speech and assembly
rights and argued that “[t]he right to congregate is a component part of
the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble’ guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”247 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited Perry
three times and resolved the case under a free speech analysis without
reference to the freedom of assembly. The Court, in fact, has not
addressed a freedom of assembly claim in the last twenty years.248
X.

CONCLUSION

The disappearance of the freedom of assembly from legal and
political discourse is intriguing in a country that attaches so much
importance to the Bill of Rights in general and the First Amendment in
particular. It may be that the principles encapsulated in the
constitutional right of association embrace a kind of group autonomy
that broadens the conception of assembly. But I suspect otherwise. I
have detailed elsewhere the doctrinal problems with the freedom of
association, both in its original form that emerged in NAACP v.
Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
245. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
246. Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Brief for Petitioners at 64, 74, Boos, 485 U.S. 312 (No. 86-803).
248. In City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that prohibited “criminal street gang members” from
loitering in public places. But while the lower court had relied on the freedom of assembly to
hold the ordinance unconstitutional, the Supreme Court cited “the First Amendment ‘right of
association’ that our cases have recognized.” Id. at 53. Justice Scalia has invoked the
freedom of assembly (among others) in his dissents from the Court’s decisions upholding
restrictions on the activities of antiabortion protesters. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.,
512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 774, 779
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The language of assembly reappeared in the text of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc1-5 (limiting government restrictions on “the religious exercise of a person,
including a religious assembly or institution”).
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Alabama and its transformation in the Court’s 1984 decision, Roberts
v. United States Jaycees.249 These cases and others have converted the
right of association into an instrument of control rather than a
protection for the people. In doing so, they have lost sight of the
dissenting, public, and expressive groups that once sought refuge
under the right of assembly.250 They have ignored the wise counsel of
C. Edwin Baker that “[c]hallenges to existing values and decisions to
embody and express dissident values are precisely the choices and
activities that cannot be properly evaluated by summations of existing
preferences” and that “the constitutional right of assembly ought to
protect activities that are unreasonable from the perspective of the
existing order.”251 By losing touch with our past recognition of the
freedom of assembly and the groups that embodied it, we risk
embracing too easily an attenuated framework that cedes to the state
authority over what kinds of groups are acceptable in the democratic
experiment. Democracy and stability may be easier in the short term,
but in forgetting the freedom of assembly, we forget the kind of politics
that has brought us this far.

249. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For my critiques of the freedom of association, see Inazu,

supra note 18, and John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly (2009) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file in the University of
North Carolina thesis database). See also Mazzone, supra note 29, at 645-46 (“[E]xpressive
association has shifted the focus away from associating and to the more familiar First
Amendment territory of speech . . . and the like,” and “the modern notion of ‘expression’ is a
dubious peg on which to hang a constitutional right of free association.”); El-Haj, supra note
29, at 589 (“[T]he right of assembly should not be collapsed into the right of free
expression.”).
250. Cf. El-Haj, supra note 29, at 588 (“We seem to have forgotten that the right of
assembly, like the right to petition, was originally considered central to securing democratic
responsiveness and active democratic citizens. We now view it instead as simply another
facet of the individual’s right of free expression, focusing almost exclusively on the question
of whether the group’s message will be heard.”); ZICK, supra note 16, at 325 (“Our long
tradition of public expression, dissent, and contention, from the earliest activities in the
colonies to present-day peace activists, agitators, and dissenters, has been possible owing to
relatively open access to embodied, contested, inscribed, and other places on the expressive
topography.”).
251. BAKER, supra note 9, at 134. I expand upon these concepts in INAZU, supra note
249.

